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RECOGNIZING THE LIABILITY OF SOCIAL
HOSTS WHO KNOWINGLY ALLOW INTOXICATED
GUESTS TO DRIVE: LIMITS TO SOCIALLY
ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR
INTRODUCTION
Of the 42,600 fatal automobile accidents that occurred in the United
States in 1983, as many as sixty-five percent involved drinking drivers. I In
the State of Washington, drinking drivers were involved in almost forty
percent of fatal auto crashes in 1983.2 Although the large incidence of
drinking and driving has long been a concern of highway safety profession-
als, more recently public concern and outrage have focused on the problem
of the drunken driver. The rise of grassroots organizations such as Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Students Against Drunk Driving
(SADD), and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) reflect this sharpened
public attention.3 At the national level, a presidential commission has made
a number of recommendations aimed at curbing drinking and driving.4
State governments, including the Washington State Legislature, have
attempted to strengthen laws affecting drunken drivers. 5 These efforts,
1. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BD., DEFICIENCIES IN ENFORCEMENT, JUDICIAL, AND TREAT-
MENT PROGRAMS RELATED TO REPEAT OFFENDER DRUNK DRIVERs 2 (adopted September 18, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as NTSB SAFETY STUDY]; see also PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL
REPoRT 1 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter PREs. COMM'N REPORT]. Over the past ten years, 250,000 Americans
have died in alcohol related crashes. Economic loss due to drunken driving is estimated to be $21 billion
annually. Id.
2. WASHINGTON TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM'N, DATA SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF 1983 TRAFFIC COLLI-
SIONS 11-17 (1983).
3. NTSB SAFETY STUDY, supra note 1, at 2. The press has begun to focus attention on the damage
caused by the drinking driver and the possible causes of and cures for the problem. See, e.g., Motorist in
Fatal Crash Has a History of Drunken Driving, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 30, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
4. See PRES. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-17. The Presidential Commission's recommen-
dations include use of judicially approved roadblocks, enactment of civil liability acts, and the creation
of other programs to provide assistance to victims of intoxicated drivers.
5. Declaring that "previous attempts to curtail the incidence of drinking and driving have been...
inadequate," the Washington State Legislature in 1983 passed a series of measures aimed at insuring
"swift and certain punishment for those who drink and drive." E.S.H.B. 289, 48th Leg., 1983 Reg.
Sess., 1983 Washington Laws 758. The legislature increased the time that those who drive while
intoxicated or refuse to submit to breathalyzer tests will be denied the privilege of driving. Enforcement
mechanisms include revoking existing driver's licenses and denying driver's licenses to those who have
not yet qualified for a license. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 46.61.515(5), 46.20.610() (Supp. 1984). The
legislature also established the crimes of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. Id. §§ 46.61.520,
46.61.522. In 1984 the legislature enacted a measure to provide funds to local police and courts to assist
in enforcing new drunken driving laws. S.H.B. 1582, 48th Leg., 1984 Reg. Sess., 1984 Washington
Laws 530. Washington law also imposes jail sentences on those convicted of driving while intoxicated.
See WASH. REv. CODE § 46.61.515(l)-(2) (Supp. 1984); see also Spellman to Get Tough on Drunk
Driving, Seattle Times, Nov. 26, 1984, at DI, col. 4 (final ed.) But see Jewett Says Law on Drunken
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however, have focused primarily on deterrence and punishment of the
drinking driver, rather than on compensating those injured by drunken
drivers.6
Gradually, courts havejoined these efforts to alleviate the harm caused by
the intoxicated driver. A few courts have recognized an action in tort against
those who contribute to drunken driving by serving intoxicating liquor.
These courts have acted, in part, to relieve victims of the costs of drunken
driving and to distribute the costs among those responsible for its occur-
rence.
Washington courts should recognize the liability of a negligent social
purveyor of alcoholic beverages. Courts need not be constrained from
recognizing a common law cause of action because of competing social
interests or legislative inaction. Washington courts should rule that a social
host who has served a guest alcohol to the point of obvious intoxication has
the duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the guest from operating a motor
vehicle. While courts may and should extend liability via common law,
supplementary legislative action is also desirable.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Commercial Vendors
Many states have enacted civil liability or "dram shop" acts. These
statutes allow an injured third party to recover damages from a liquor vendor
for injuries inflicted by a customer whom the vendor had served past the
point of obvious intoxication. 7 In the absence of a dram shop act, some
courts have extended liability to vendors of intoxicants under common law
negligence principles. 8 Other courts, however, have refused to extend
Drivers is a Crime, Seattle Times/Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 9, 1984, at A4, col. 3 (deferred
prosecution law allows drunken drivers to escape prison).
6. At the national level, the recommendations put forth by the NTSB include use of on-the-spot
preliminary breath test devices, increased training ofjudges regarding alcohol issues, and preclusion of
the reduction of an alcohol-related charge to a nonalcohol-related charge. See NTSB SAFETY STUDY,
supra note 1, at 46-47. An incentive grant program aimed at stimulating alcohol traffic safety programs
at the state level also focused primarily on deterring and penalizing drunken drivers. See 23 U.S.C.
§ 408 (1982). But see Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333,364 (1984) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)); S. REP. No. 65,98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 43-44 (1983). The 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act include a provision that prevents
debts incurred as a result of an act of drunken driving to be discharged in bankruptcy-the express
purpose of this provision is to deter drunken driving and to protect victims of the drunken driver.
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
8. See, e.g., Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500,667 P.2d 200 (1983); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge
No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
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liability to vendors in the absence of civil liability legislation.9
B. Social Hosts
In a few states, courts have construed dram shop statutes to be broad
enough to include liability for a social host, as well as a commercial
purveyor. ' 0 In the absence of dram shop legislation, other courts have been
willing to rely on common law negligence principles to hold a social host
liable to a third party for injuries inflicted by an intoxicated guest. "1 Many
of the courts extending liability have limited their holdings to situations
where the intoxicated guest is a minor or is developmentally disabled. 12
Three jurisdictions, however, have held a host liable for negligence, even
if the guest served is a competent adult. The Oregon Supreme Court in
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 13 was the
first court to recognize the liability of the social purveyor, without regard to
the age of the intoxicated guest. 14 The California Supreme Court extended
liability several years later,15 only to be overruled by the state legislature. 16
9. See, e.g., Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 450 P.2d 358 (Nev. 1969); Holmes v. Circo, 196
Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115,
200 N.W.2d 150 (1972). Other courts, however, have refused to interpret dram shop acts to include
liability fora social host. See, e.g., Millerv. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 412,199 N.E.2d 300
(1964); LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967).
In Minnesota, where the courts construed the dram shop statute to extend liability to a social purveyor,
the legislature responded by abrogating the extension. After the ruling in Ross v. Ross, the Minnesota
dram shop act was amended to limit liability to those who sell alcohol, rather than include those who
give alcohol to intoxicated persons. MN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984); see Cole v. City of
Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn. 1982). For an example of a dram shop act that does not
limit coverage to commercial purveyors, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984) (cause of
action exists against licensee or permittee who serves alcohol to a person to the point of intoxication).
11. See, e.g., Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 1241, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1982); Coulter v.
Superior Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 699,145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Brattain v.
Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663,309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820
(1973); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538,476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356
A.2d 15 (1976); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632,485 P.2d 18
(1971).
12. See, e.g., Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. at 132, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (developmentally
disabled individual); Brattain v. Heron, 309 N.E.2d at 157 (minor); Thaut v. Finley, 213 N.W.2d at 822
(minor); Linn v. Rand, 365 A.2d at 17 (minor).
13. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
14. The court stated that a host has the duty to deny guests further access to alcohol when:
the host has reason to know that he is dealing with persons whose characteristics make it especially
likely that they will do unreasonable things-such persons could include those already severely
intoxicated, those whose behavior the host knows will be unusually affected by alcohol. Also
included might be young people, if their ages were such that they could be expected by virtue of
their youth alone or in connection with other circumstances to behave in a dangerous fashion under
the influence of alcohol.
Wiener, 485 P.2d at 21.
15. Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39.
16. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1984).
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Most recently, in Kelly v. Gwinnell, 17 New Jersey recognized the liability of
a social host. 18 The court in Kelly held that when a host provides liquor
directly to a social guest, continues to do so even beyond the point at which
the host knows the guest is intoxicated, and does this knowing that the guest
will soon operate a motor vehicle, that host is liable for the foreseeable
consequences to third parties that result from the guest's drunken driving. 19
B. Washington Law
Until 1955 an injured party could bring a civil action in Washington
against a purveyor of liquor under the state dram shop act. 20 The legislature,
however, repealed the dram shop act in 1955.21 Subsequent to repeal of the
statute, the Washington Supreme Court in Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler
Co. 22 followed the common law rule that no liability exists for those who
serve alcoholic beverages. The court held that the only exception to the rule
of nonliability was for purveyors who furnish alcohol to a guest or customer
who is in such a state of helplessness or debauchery as to be deprived of
responsibility for his or her behavior. The court also ruled that it is not per se
negligent to sell or give alcohol in violation of a law other than a civil
liability act. 23
In Halvorson, an employer was sued by an individual injured in an
automobile accident caused by an employee who had left a company party
while under the influence of alcohol. 24 The court stated that the law
recognizes no relation of proximate cause between a vendor or donor of
liquor and a tort committed by a buyer or recipient intoxicated by the
liquor.25 Liability, the court concluded, should be extended beyond the
narrow common law exception only at the behest of the legislature.26
The four dissenting justices in Halvorson argued that the legislature did
not destroy common law rights of recovery when it repealed Washington's
17. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
18. In Kelly a social host served liquor to his guest beyond the point of obvious intoxication. The
host then accompanied the guest to his car, talked with him, and watched him drive away. The guest
subsequently became involved in a serious car accident in which the plaintiff was injured, Id.
19. Id. at 1230. For a case applying Kelly to a social host in a business setting, see Davis v. Sam
Goody, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 423, 480 A.2d 212 (App. Div. 1984).
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.100 (1962).
21. H.B. 540, 34th Leg., 1955 Reg. Sess., 1955 Washington Laws 1538.
22. 76 Wn. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
23. Id. at 762, 458 P.2d at 899 (citing 30 AM. JUR. INTOXICATING LIQUORS § 521 (1958)).
24. Id. at 760, 458 P.2d at 897.
25. Id. at 763, 458 P.2d at 899.
26. Id. at 765, 458 P.2d at 900.
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dram shop act. 27 They sought to attach common law liability to social hosts
when the social gathering is for business purposes. 28
Washington courts subsequently applied the Halvorson ruling to exempt
commercial vendors of alcohol from liability to third parties. 29 Post-
Halvorson courts also refused to recognize the liability of social hosts who
furnish alcohol to a minor, although serving the minor guest violates state
law.30 For a time, the cases following Halvorson retained the view that
drinking, not serving, alcohol was the proximate cause of injuries caused by
intoxicated guests and patrons. 31
In Wilson v. Steinbach32 a minor was killed in an automobile accident
after consuming liquor at a party. The court once again refused to extend
liability to social hosts, ruling that the guest was not obviously intoxicated.
The court held that "obvious intoxication" should be judged by the way the
guest appears to those around him or her, not by what a blood test may
subsequently reveal.33 The Wilson court purported to reaffirm the common
law standard of nonliability for furnishing intoxicants to able-bodied per-
sons and its exception as originally set out in Halvorson. The court,
however, altered the exception to nonliability. According to the Wilson
court, liability can arise for serving persons who are 1) in a state of
helplessness, 2) obviously intoxicated, or 3) in a special relationship to the
furnisher of the intoxicants. 34 The court again stated that an extension of
common law liability to social hosts should come from the legislature. 35
Justice Utter, in a concurring opinion, agreed that "obvious intoxica-
tion" should be judged by a subjective standard. Since the guest in Wilson
did not meet this standard, he voted to deny recovery. However, he agreed
with the four dissenting justices in Halvorson that a common law right of
recovery existed against a social host.36
Shortly after the Wilson decision, the court held that a commercial
vendor of liquor could be liable for the wrongful death of a minor-patron
who had died in a car accident after becoming obviously intoxicated at the
vendor's lounge. 37 The court in Young v. Caravan Corp. denied the vendor's
motion for summary judgment, holding that sufficient evidence existed to
27. Id. at 766, 458 P.2d at 901 (Finley, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 771, 458 P.2d at 903-04.
29. See Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975).
30. Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wn. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn. 2d at 916, 541 P.2d at 369.
32. 98 Wn. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
33. Id. at 438-39, 656 P.2d at 1033.
34. Id. at 438, 656 P.2d at 1032.
35. Id. at 441-42, 656 P.2d at 1034.
36. Id. at 442-43, 656 P.2d at 1034-35 (Utter, J., concurring).
37. Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn. 2d 655, 660, 663 P.2d 834, 837 (1983).
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prove that the guest was obviously intoxicated. The court also ruled that
serving alcohol to a minor was a violation of state statute, constituting
negligence per se.38 The latter ruling is directly contrary to the Halvorson
holding, although the court did not expressly overrule Halvorson.39
In light of Young, the Washington court of appeals recently refused to
dismiss an action brought by a third party against the host of a company
party.40 The host allegedly served alcohol to an adult guest to the point of
obvious intoxication. The intoxicated guest became involved in an auto
accident in which the plaintiff was seriously injured. In refusing to dismiss
the action, the court of appeals relied on the fact that, under Wilson and
Young, serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated individual is an excep-
tion to the rule of nonliability for the purveyors of liquor.4
1
II. ANALYSIS
A. Washington Courts' Competence to Extend Liability to Social Hosts
The fundamental purpose of tort law is to place the losses arising from
social activities on blameworthy rather than innocent parties.42 Tort law also
seeks to discourage unreasonable activities. 43 In order to fulfill its purpose,
tort law must constantly evolve to keep pace with changing societal norms
and concerns. The reform of tort law is an area that warrants special judicial
attention and action, especially since many actions in tort involve judicially
created common law.44 In addition, legislatures seldom reevaluate tort law
on a consistent basis.45
Courts would promote the objectives of tort law by recognizing a cause of
action against a negligent social purveyor of liquor. Common law tort
liability would allocate the costs of drunken driving to blameworthy hosts
38. Id. at 660, 663 P.2d at 837.
39. See Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wn. App. 84, 89, 678 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1984). The Young court also
failed to expressly overrule other cases in which the court had previously refused to extend common law
liability to purveyors of liquor on facts similar to those in Young. See, e.g., Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wn. App.
509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974).
40. Halligan, 37 Wn. App. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1298. Halligan is scheduled for the remanded trial on
November 5, 1985. Telephone interview with Jack Rosenow, attorney for respondent Frank Pupo (Oct.
6, 1984).
41. Halligan, 37 Wn. App. at 90, 678 P.2d at 1299 (Johnson, J., concurring).
42. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th Ed.
1984); see Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, 65 Wn. 2d 174, 177, 396 P.2d 546, 549 (1964).
43. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 42, § 4, at 25-26.
44. See Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wn. 2d 131, 136, 691 P.2d 190, 193 (1984) (courts
responsible for the upkeep of the common law to meet evolving standards of justice); Peck, Comments
on Judicial Creativity, 69 IowA L. REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Peck, Judicial Creativity]; Peck, The Role
of Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963) [hereinafter Peck,
The Role of Courts].
45. Peck, The Role of Courts, supra note 44, at 290-91.
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rather than the victims of the intoxicated driver.46 Social host liability could
also prevent unreasonable behavior by social hosts that contributes to the
drinking driver problem. 47 In Washington, the rules concerning liability for
those contributing to drinking and driving are court-created. The courts
should reevaluate these rules in light of the change in social attitudes toward
drunken driving.48
In fulfilling the objectives of tort law, courts often must extend liability in
the face of competing social considerations. When courts allocate the costs
of drunken driving to a blameworthy social host, for example, they risk
unduly interfering with social relationships by forcing the host to reason-
ably oversee the serving of liquor and to take steps to prevent intoxicated
guests from driving while drunk.49 This type of social interference may
diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and camaraderie of social gatherings
where alcohol is served.50
Washington courts have made the difficult decision in other contexts to
intrude into relationships and organizations that historically had been
considered outside the bounds of state interference. For example, the
supreme court has abrogated the long favored doctrines of interspousa 51
and parent-child 52 tort immunity, as well as tort immunity for charitable and
religious organizations. 53 The court acted because the need to relieve
victims of the cost of injury and the need to discourage unreasonable
behavior outweighed the absolute sanctity of intrafamily relationships and
favored organizations. 54 Similarly, the need to relieve drunken driving
victims of their cost of injury outweighs the inconveniences and social
46. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.9.
47. Id. at 1226; Comment, One More For the Road: Civil Liability of Licensees and Social Hosts
For Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages to Minors, 59 B.U.L. REv. 725, 728-29 (1979).
48. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1229; see also PES. COMM'N REPoRr, supra note 1, at 1-2.
49. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1229; see also DeMoulin &Whitcomb, SocialHost'sLiability in Furnishing
Alcoholic Beverages, 27 FED'N OF INS. CouNs. Q. 349, 351 (1977) (authors question whether social
host can control the conduct of guests).
50. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1229.
51. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
52. Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn. 2d411, 610 P.2d 891(1980); see also Borstv. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d 642,
251 P.2d 149 (1952). In Borst, the policy considerations used to justify the immunity doctrine were
rejected, including the argument that allowing an action would undermine parental authority and destroy
family tranquility. Id. at 647, 251 P.2d at 153. The Merrick court approved this analysis. 93 Wn. 2d at
413, 610 P.2d at 892.
53. Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, Inc., 65 Wn. 2d 174, 396 P.2d 546 (1964) (abrogating tort
immunity with respect to both charitable and religious organizations).
54. See Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn. 2d at 413,610 P.2d at 892-93; Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d at
192, 500 P.2d at 777.
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dislocation caused by state intrusion in social gatherings and rela-
tionships. 55 Social host liability may also benefit society by keeping many
intoxicated drivers off the roads.56
The process of allocating the risk of loss to blameworthy parties may also
force courts to make troublesome decisions about the reasonableness of
conduct or injury. If courts recognize social host liability, they will often
have to make difficult judgments about whether a social host has acted
reasonably under the circumstances. 57
Washington courts have extended liability in instances where determin-
ing the reasonableness of actions or injury was difficult. For example, the
courts have recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. 58 They did so despite earlier reservations that such an
extension might result in unlimited liability59 because of the difficulty in
determining the reasonableness of injury.60 The courts acted, however, upon
recognizing that serious psychological damage might go uncompensated in
55. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1229.
56. While the Kelly court extended liability primarily to compensate the victims of drunken driving,
the court pointed out that the decision would also tend to deter drunken driving. Extending liability,
however, did not depend on the effectiveness of deterrence. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1226. For
the law to deter behavior the law must become known to the general public. In light of the large amount
of publicity given to judicial and legislative treatment of the drunken driving problem it is likely that
recognition of social host liability would become known to the general public. See. e.g., supra note 3;
Expensive Pour: Beware of Drunken Guests, TIME 73 (March 4, 1985) (reporting on settlement in Kelly
v. Gwinnell). Some commentators have suggested that extending liability to social hosts will increase
total deterrence. See Note, Torts-California Finds a Social Host Can Be Liable To Third Parties For
Intoxicated Guests' Negligent Acts-Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 12 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 945, 970 (1979). Other commentators, however, argue that extending liability will have no
significant deterrent effect. See Comment, Beyond the Dram Shop Act: Imposition of Common Law
Liability on Purveyors of Liquor, 63 IOwA L. REv. 1282, 1303 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d
at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975).
58. See Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn. 2d 424, 435-36, 553 P.2d 1102-03 (1976). Owing to the general
concern that recognizing such a cause of action would lead to unrestricted liability, the Hunsley court set
out three requirements a plaintiff must meet to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress: (1) the injury must be reaonably foreseeable at the time of the negligent act; (2) the reaction
must be reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the distress must be manifested by objective
symptoms. See also Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn. 2d 411,416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (court agrees to
abrogate parental tort immunity; limits its holding by stating that other parental torts would be
considered on a case-by-case basis); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d 642, 651-52, 251 P.2d 148, 154 (1952)
(the fact that abrogating parent-child tort immunity will force courts to face "difficult cases" is not a
reason to deny recovery).
59. In initially rejecting a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Washington court
relied on the reasoning ofTobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.S.2d 609,249 N.E.2d 419 (1969). See Grimsby v.
Samson, 85 Wn. 2d 52, 56-57, 530 P.2d 291, 293-94 (1975). In Tobin, the court stated that if it allowed
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, limited only by foreseeability, the principle could
not and would not remain confined and the result would be unlimited liability. Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 424.
60. See supra note 58.
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the absence of a cause of action.61 Similarly, courts should act to assist
victims of drunken driving who might go uncompensated in the absence of
a negligence action against social purveyors of alcohol. 62
Washington courts have continually balked at recognizing the liability of
social purveyors of alcohol, preferring instead to defer to the legislature. 63
Courts argue that the legislature should be allowed to exercise its superior
capacity to collect information and hold hearings before liability is
extended. 64 However, the information that is pertinent to the question of
whether judicial action should be taken against a social host is available to
the judiciary. Information concerning the magnitude of the drunken driver
problem, the impact of the problem on innocent persons, and the extent of
public outcry against continued tolerance of intoxicated drivers is legion in
government publications and the press.65 Evidence of the insurance
ramifications for the social host,66 as well as general analysis of the pros and
cons of extending liability are available in legal periodicals.67
Moreover, the common law rule of nonliability for liquor purveyors and
its exceptions are court-created. 68 Courts, therefore, are competent to
provide a cause of action against a social host under common law negli-
gence principles, 69 unless the legislature has dictated otherwise.70 The
61. Id.
62. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1226.
63. See Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn. 2d at 441-42, 656 P.2d at 1034.
64. Kelly v. Gwirnell, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). But see Peck, Judicial
Creativity, supra note 44, at 8; Peck, The Role of Courts, supra note 44, at 275-77. Peck notes that
legislative committees seldom fulfill the idealized notion of airing competing policy factors and
performing thorough investigation. When committee hearings are held, it is likely that the purpose is to
discover the amount of support for, and the strength of the opposition against a certain bill and not to
accumulate information to use in formulating legislation.
65. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1222; see also NTSB SAFETY STUDY, supra note 1, at 2;
PRES. COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
66. See Kelly 476 A.2d at 1225. A survey of several large insurance carriers in Washington indicates
that if a social host were to be held liable, the liability would be covered by a standard homeowner's or
renter's insurance policy. Telephone interviews with insurance company representatives (notes of
telephone interviews and letters of verification on file at the Washington Law Review). Evidence from
other states indicates that additional liability coverage would not be exceedingly costly: $55 per year for
$1,000,000 of additional coverage in Minnesota and $7 per year for an additional $300,000 of liability
coverage in North Dakota. Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liability For the Social
Host, 49 N.D.L. REv. 67, 81 n.74 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused By the Negligent Acts of
Intoxicated Guests, 16 WuiA1 r L. REv. 561 (1980); Comment, Beyond the Dram Shop Act:
Imposition of Common LawLiability on Purveyors ofAlcohol, 63 IOwA L. REv. 1282 (1978); Comment,
supra note 47, at 725; Comment, Social Host Liability For Furnishing Alcohol: A LegalHangover?, 10
PAc. L. J. 95 (1978); Note, Social HostLiabilityforFurnishing Liquor-Finding a BasisforRecovery in
Kentucky, 3 N.KY. L. REv. 229 (1976).
68. See Halvorson, 76 Wn. 2d at 761-63, 458 P.2d at 898-99 (common law duty announced by the
court takes place of repealed dram shop act).
69. See Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of AlphaTau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632,485 P.2d 18, 21
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Washington State Legislature has not precluded a common law right of
recovery against social purveyors of alcohol. 71 A court that unduly defers to
the legislature does not act without consequence-deference may force an
innocent victim to shoulder the costs of his or her injury.72
B. Washington Courts Have Been Moving Toward an Extension of
Liability to Social Hosts
Since the repeal of Washington's dram shop act in 1955 and the
Halvorson decision, which restricted common law tort liability with respect
to purveyors of intoxicants, case law and popular sentiment have moved
toward extending liability. While purporting to follow the Halvorson line of
cases, the court has opened the door for the extension of liability by its
rulings in Wilson v. Steinbach and Young v. Caravan Corp.
The exceptions to nonliability for purveyors of alcohol as reformulated in
Wilson and Young are now broad enough, on their face, to encompass
actions against social hosts who serve alcohol to either minor or adult
n.2. The court in Wiener stated that Oregon's repealed dram shop act was never intended by the
legislature to be the only source of recovery, especially since the act only provided a remedy for a limited
class of plaintiffs. Id. When courts extend common law liability they risk legislative backlash. See Peck,
The Role of the Courts, supra note 44, at 294-95. In 1978 the California legislature responded to the
court's extension of liability by passing legislation that exempted social purveyors from liability for the
torts of their intoxicated guests. See supra notes 15 & 16. More recently in Oregon, however, the
legislature passed a statute that provides a cause of action against social hosts that is stricter than the
court's original extension of common law liability. See infra note 112.
70. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d at 189, 500 P.2d at 775 (interspousal immunity); Friend v. Cove
Methodist Church, Inc., 65 Wn. 2d at 178, 396 P.2d at 549 (charitable and religious organizations);
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 657, 251 P.2d at 156-57 (parent-child). In Freehe the court rejected the
argument that it should defer to the legislature on the issue of abrogating interspousal tort immunity. The
court stated that the argument to defer ignored the fact that the rule was not made or sanctioned by the
legislature, but rather was one that depended for its origins and continued viability upon common law. 81
Wn. 2d at 189,500 P.2d at 775. The true role of the legislature is to restrict liability if it chooses to do so.
Where the proposal is to open the doors of the courts, rather than close them, the courts are quite
competent to act for themselves. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 657, 251 P.2d at 156-57.
71. The repeal of Washington's dram shop act should not be read as legislative intent to deny all
common law rights of recovery against those who purvey alcohol. When the legislature abrogates a
common law right of recovery it does so explicitly. Halvorson, 76 Wn. 2d at 766,458 P.2d at 901 (Finley,
J., dissenting). See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 51.04.010 (Supp. 1984) (common law system governing
the remedy for workmen against employers for industrial injuries specifically overruled). Lack of action
on the part of the legislature should not be construed as tacit approval of the status quo. See Peck,
Judicial Creativity, supra note 44, at 8-9; Peck, The Role of the Courts, supra note 44, at 285 & 290-91
(legislatures do not make a constant reevaluation of tort law, and victims' lobbies, if they exist at all, are
ineffective in forcing reforms of tort law). The 1983 amendments to Washington's drunken driving laws
were apparently not intended to be the exclusive method of dealing with the problem of the intoxicated
driver. See 1983 Washington Laws 758 (the legislature does not intend to discourage or deter courts from
directing or providing treatment for problem drinkers, so long as such treatment does not supplant
legislative sanctions).
72. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1226.
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guests.73 The exceptions apply not only to commercial vendors but to
anyone "furnish[ing] intoxicants to [an] able-bodied person." 74 Moreover,
the exceptions to nonliability refer to serving intoxicants to "persons" in a
state of helplessness, "persons" obviously intoxicated, and "persons" in a
special relationship to the furnisher of the intoxicants.75 The exceptions do
not apply exclusively to minors or any other subset of "persons."
The court in Young also veered away from the concept of proximate cause
that had been applied since Halvorson. In Halvorson, the court held that the
law recognizes no relation of proximate cause between the sale or giving of
liquor, and the injury caused by a person who becomes intoxicated by the
liquor. 76 Contrary to this reasoning, the court in Young held that a purveyor
can be guilty of negligence for the act of serving alcohol. 77
By reformulating the exceptions to nonliability to include social pur-
veyors of alcohol and by tacitly recognizing that serving intoxicants can be
the proximate cause of an injury, the court has cleared the path for extending
liability to negligent social hosts. Taking this step would be a constructive
and a timely reform of Washington common law.
III. , PROPOSED COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WASHINGTON
This Comment proposes a cause of action against social hosts, stated in
terms of the traditional elements of the law of negligence. This cause of
action differs from the action extended by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Kelly v. Gwinnell and is a departure from the standard exceptions to
common law liability set out in Young. Instead, this Comment proposes that
the courts recognize that a social host has a duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent an intoxicated guest from operating a motor vehicle if: 1) the host
73. Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wn. App. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1298.
74. Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn. 2d 655, 658, 663 P.2d 834, 836 (1983); Wilson v. Steinbach,
98 Wn. 2d 434, 438, 656 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1982).
75. See Young, 99 Wn. 2d at 658,663 P.2d at 836; Wilson, 98 Wn. 2d at 438,656 P.2d at 1032. A
court of appeals case subsequent to Young held that Young is not limited to situations in which a
commercial vendor serves alcohol to a minor since the Young court did not specifically place any
limitation on its holding. Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wn. App. at 89, 678 P.2d at 1298-99; see Brattain v.
Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663,309 N.E.2d 150 (1974) (where the court explicitly limited its holding to the
serving of alcohol to minors).
76. Halvorson, 76 Wn. 2d at 763, 458 P.2d at 889.
77. The court in Young did not explicitly overrule the definition of proximate cause that had been
applied by the court since Halvorson. Young, 99 Wn. 2d at 660, 663 P.2d at 837. However, in order to
find a purveyor of alcohol liable for injuries caused by the intoxication related to the service of alcohol,
the court must be holding that the serving, not merely the consuming, of alcohol is a proximate cause of
the injury. See Halligan, 37 Wn. App. at 89, 678 P.2d at 1298; see also Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn. 2d at 916,
541 P.2d at 369.
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has served alcohol to the guest to the point of obvious intoxication; 2) the
host knows or should know that the guest is obviously intoxicated; and 3)
the host knows or should know that the intoxicated guest will be operating a
motor vehicle.
A. Duty
Under certain circumstances a social host should have a duty to take
actions to prevent an intoxicated guest from driving. The duty to act is based
on the fact that, by introducing alcohol into a social setting, the host
produces a situation of potential risk for the public and the intoxicated
guest. Where one produces a situation of risk, even by innocent behavior,78
he or she has a duty to take action to ensure that the risk does not become
actual harm. 79
The duty to act does not arise until the host has "served" the guest
alcohol to, or past, the point of obvious intoxication. Some courts have
taken a restrictive view of what it means to serve alcohol to a patron or
guest. The New Jersey court in Kelly limited its holding to instances where
the host directly serves alcohol to the guest.80 A recent Washington court of
appeals decision set out a less restrictive standard than Kelly, stating that
"[t]he relevant inquiry is who had authority to deny further service of
alcohol when intoxication became apparent. "81 Other courts have applied
an even broader definition of activity that would be considered serving
alcohol.82
A broad definition of behavior constituting "serving" intoxicants is the
most appropriate. The "risky" behavior that a host is undertaking is the act
of introducing alcohol into a situation where people are liable to consume to
the point of intoxication and then operate a motor vehicle. The host creates
78. One who produces a hazard need not be negligent for the duty of care to arise. Zylka v. Leikvoll,
274 Minn. 435, 144 N.W.2d 358, 367 (1966); See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 42 § 56, at
377; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tom-s § 321 (1965); see also Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 118
S.E.2d 492 (1961) (defendant driver innocently hit and killed a cow on the roadway; driver then under a
duty to use reasonable care to remove the animal from the highway, give warning, or otherwise protect
other drivers); Hollinbeck v. Downey, 261 Minn. 481, 113 N.W.2d 9, 12-13 (1962) (golfer who hooked
golf shot had duty to call warning); Chandler v. Forsyth Royal Crown Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 245, 125
S.E.2d 584, 587 (1962) (bottles fell from truck and shattered on road; driver had duty to remove glass
from road).
79. See supra note 78; see also Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 E2d 103,106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 830 (1947) (host had duty to take reasonable steps to rescue guest who had fallen overboard while
attending a social gathering on the host's cruiser); Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695,225 N.E.2d 841,
842-43 (1967).
80. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1230.
81. Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wn. App. at 89, 678 P.2d at 1298.
82. In Peterson v. Jack Donelson Sales Co., 4 111. App. 792, 281 N.E.2d 753,756 (1972), the court
ruled that a beer distributor had served alcohol when it provided a large amount of beer, ice, and cups for
a labor union gathering, even though the distributor was not physically present to dispense the liquor.
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this risk whether he or she introduces alcohol into the situation directly, by
providing alcohol for each guest, or indirectly, by inviting the guests to
bring their own alcoholic beverages. A host who intends to introduce
alcohol into a social gathering should not escape responsibility merely by
asking others to provide the alcohol. 83 However, a guest who brings alcohol
to a gathering at the host's residence without the invitation or consent of the
host has not been "served" by the host.
The social host must serve a guest alcohol to or past the point of
intoxication before a duty attaches. The court in Kelly stated that a host is
liable who continues to serve alcohol to a guest beyond the point at which
the guest is obviously intoxicated. 84 A large portion of the danger created
by serving alcohol, however, occurs by serving a person to the point of
intoxication, not merely by serving beyond that point. A person's capacity
to control a motor vehicle is often dangerously diminished before obvious
intoxication. 85 A court that recognizes a duty of care when the host serves a
guest to the point of obvious intoxication, therefore, better addresses the
danger associated with purveying alcohol than did the Kelly court.
86
The social host's duty to act arises only when the host knows or reason-
ably should know that a guest is intoxicated and that the intoxicated guest is
preparing to operate a motor vehicle. The knowledge requirement gives the
host notice of when he or she has the obligation to take action. 87 The dissent
in Kelly protested that a social host could become intoxicated and thus avoid
knowledge of a guest's intoxication. 88 To avoid such a result, a constructive
knowledge standard should supplement the basic knowledge requirement.
If a host reasonably should know that a guest is intoxicated and about to
operate a motor vehicle, the host will be liable even if he or she lacks actual
knowledge.
To establish knowledge of the guest's intoxication, the court in Kelly
relied solely on post-accident evidence of the guest's blood-alcohol con-
tent. 89 Washington courts, however, have consistently ruled that a person's
83. See Corriment, California Liquor Liability: Who's To Pay the Costs?, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 490,
520 (1980). The Comment suggests that previous attempts to extend liability left a loophole since a
social host is liable only when he or she "serves" alcohol.
84. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1230.
85. See Comment, supra note 46, at 735-36.
86. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 156, 577 P.2d 669, 676, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534,541
(1978) (Mosk, J., concurring). The plaintiff would be compelled to prove that the alcohol served by the
social host produced the original intoxication, and that any additional alcohol served to an obviously
intoxicated guest increased or prolonged the existing state of intoxication. See also IowA CODE ANN.
§ 123.92 (West Supp. 1984) (cause of action exists against licensee or permittee who serves a person
alcohol to the point of intoxication).
87. Comment, supra note 47, at 735.
88. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1220 (majority opinion). The court found obvious intoxication by relying on expert
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sobriety must be judged by the way the person appeared to those present,
not by what a blood test may subsequently reveal. 90 The Washington test is
appropriate. To impose liability upon a finding, through subsequent scien-
tific testing, that the guest was legally intoxicated is problematic since the
host would not have sufficient notice, at the time, that a duty to act existed.9'
The social host owes a duty both to the general public and to an
intoxicated guest to take reasonable steps to prevent the intoxicated guest
from driving. The court in Kelly v. Gwinnell limited recovery to injured third
parties.92 A claim by the intoxicated guest, however, should be allowed as
well. When a guest has been served alcohol to the point of obvious
intoxication, the host has produced a risk to the potential detriment of the
guest.93 Once the host creates the risk, even by a nonculpable act such as
serving alcohol, the host has the duty to take reaonable steps to prevent the
risk from becoming actual harm. 94
Allowing a guest to recover against a host will not relieve the intoxicated
guest of responsibility for the guest's own actions, as some courts and
commentators fear.95 Washington's comparative fault statute prevents a
plaintiff from recovering damages for the injury attributable to the plain-
tiff's own conduct. 96 The guest can recover from the host only to the extent
of the host's fault. 97
B. Standard of Care
The social host's duty should be limited to taking "reasonable steps" to
prevent an intoxicated guest from operating a motor vehicle. The Kelly
testimony. The expert testified that the guest's blood alcohol concentration was 0.286 subsequent to the
accident. From this reading the expert concluded that the guest had consumed the equivalent of thirteen
drinks, must have been showing unmistakable signs of intoxication, and in fact was severely intoxicated
while at the host's residence.
90. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn. 2d at438-39, 656 P.2d at 1033; see also Young v. Caravan Corp.,
99 Wn. 2d at 659, 663 P.2d at 837; Dickinson v. Edwards, 37 Wn. App. 834, 839, 682 P.2d at 971, 973
(1984).
91. Comment, supra note 47, at 735. Although the blood-alcohol content of a guest is not
conclusive proof of obvious intoxication it may be used as evidence of obvious intoxication. See Note,
Kelly v. Gwinnell: The Social Host and His Visibly Intoxicated Guest: Joint Liability for Injuries to
Third Parties and Proper Evidentiary Tests, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 212-14 (1984).
92. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1230.
93. See Comment, supra note 47, at 735-38.
94. See supra notes 78 & 79 and accompanying text.
95. See Comment, Beyond the Dram Shop Act: Imposition of Common Law Liability on Purveyors
of Liquor. 63 IowA L. REV. 1282, 1296 (1978).
96. Under Washington's comparative fault statute an injured party can obtain a judgment against
either the guest or the social host. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1984).
97. If a judgment is obtained against the host, the host can seek contribution based on the
comparative fault of the intoxicated guest. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 (Supp. 1984).
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decision does not seem to place limitations of reasonableness on the host's
duty to act. 98 The requirement of reasonable steps will vary according to the
circumstances. The host has a duty to make a good faith effort to prevent an
intoxicated guest from driving.99 In no case should a host be expected to
perform acts that might endanger his or her physical well-being. 100 Hosts
who fail to act solely because they fear that doing so may result in social
embarassment should not be excused from taking reasonable steps.
The requirement of "reasonable steps" will, however, place a greater
burden of action on those purveyors of alcohol who have the resources and
manpower to keep an intoxicated guest or patron off the road. Commercial
vendors or business organizations that serve alcohol at large social func-
tions can reasonably hire "bouncers," provide alternative means of trans-
portation for intoxicated persons, or provide facilities for intoxicated indi-
viduals to "sleep it off."10' Moreover, from the standpoint of social
pressure, it is easier for agents of liquor establishments or agents of those
hosting large gatherings to restrain intoxicated persons. A greater standard
of care is also appropriate for these purveyors since they are likely to profit
from the overconsumption of intoxicating beverages. 102
The relative lack of expertise of a social purveyor in detecting intoxica-
tion is not a reason to grant the purveyor absolute immunity. 103 The social
host should be judged by the degree of expertise that he or she possesses. As
one commentator notes, the issue "is not whether social hosts should
always or even generally be liable. It is whether all persons should be
immune. . . as a matter of law, simply because they do not own a bar or a
98. The court in Kelly held that where a host provides liquor directly to a social guest beyond the
point of intoxication and does this knowing that the guest will soon be operating a motor vehicle, the
host is liable as ajoint tortfeasor for injuries to third parties that result from the guest's drunken driving.
476 A.2d at 1230. The court did not discuss possible defenses to liability.
99. See Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664 (1959). In Connolly,
guests attending a convention at the defendant's hotel began to menace the surrounding community. The
court ruled that the defendant had the duty to take reasonable steps to control the guests. See also
DeMoulin & Whitcomb, supra note 49, at 357 (host's liability should depend on the reasonableness of
the host's conduct).
100. See Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent in Kelly protested that to
hold the social host liable would force him or her to grapple with beligerent drunks who would not take
kindly to being denied another drink or restrained from driving home. Id. Generally, where tort law
recognizes a duty that obligates a person to "act," the person so obligated is not under a duty to risk life
or limb. See, e.g., VT. STAT. At. tit. 12, § 519 (1983) (Vermont statute creating a duty to rescue limits
the duty to instances where the rescuer is not endangered or imperiled).
101. See Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). See generally, Comment, Social Host
Liability for Furnishing Alcohol: A Legal Hangover? 10 PAc. L.J. 95, 105-06 (1978).
102. See Graham, supra note 67, at 574; see also Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91,589 P.2d 145,147
(1979) (the pecuniary motives of those selling alcohol need to be tempered).
103. The dissent in Kelly argued that a commercial vendor's expertise in detecting intoxication is a
reason not to extend liability to social purveyors. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); see
also, Graham, supra note 67, at 566.
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liquor store." 104 A court should rely on a purveyor's relative expertise to
impose a greater burden of care on the purveyor that is better able to
"know" of a person's intoxication.
C. Proximate Cause
The actions of a guest who drives while intoxicated are the cause-in-fact
of the injuries to the victims of a drunken driving accident. However, if a
host's conduct results in an injury that was reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the conduct, the conduct is the proximate or legal cause of the
injury. 105 The actual sequence of events need not be foreseeable. The harm
that occurs need only fall within a general field of danger that should have
been anticipated at the time of the defendant's conduct. 106 Courts have
exempted social purveyors of liquor from liability by ruling that consuming,
not serving, alcohol is the proximate cause of the injuries caused by an
intoxicated guest. 107 These courts have held that serving alcohol was too
remote from the injury to be its proximate cause. 108 Washington courts
applied this conception of proximate cause in Halvorson and in several
cases following Halvorson. 109
Courts holding commercial or social purveyors liable for the torts of
intoxicated consumers, however, have ruled that serving alcohol can be the
proximate cause of an injury caused by the intoxicated consumer. 110 They
reason that a purveyor produces a foreseeable risk by serving alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated person when the host knows that the intoxicated
person will soon operate a motor vehicle. This application of proximate
cause was recently applied sub silentio by the Washington Supreme Court
in Young v. Caravan Corp. I"'
Under the proposal in this Comment a host does not breach a duty by
serving alcohol to a person, even beyond the point of obvious intoxication.
Rather, the serving of alcohol creates a duty to take reasonable steps to
104. Comment, The Torts of the Intoxicated: Who Should Be Liable?, 15 COLuM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 33 (1979).
105. Eckerson v. Ford's Prairie School Dist. No. 11, 3 Wn. 2d 475,484, 101 P.2d 345,350 (1940).
106. McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wn. 2d 316, 321, 255 P.2d 360, 363 (1953).
107. See Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724,176 N.W.2d 566, 567 (1970); see also Elder v. Fisher,
247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847, 852 (1966).
108. Garcia, 176 N.W.2d at 567.
109. See, e.g., Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wn. App. 509, 512-13, 524 P.2d 255 (1974).
110. In holding a social host liable, the court in Kelly v. Gwinnell ruled that serving, as well as
drinking, alcohol can be the proximate cause of an injury to a third party or an intoxicated guest. 476
A.2d at 1222. See also Elder v. Fisher, 217 N.E.2d at 852 (commercial purveyors); Jardine v. Upper
Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550, 552-53 (1964).
111. See Young, 99 Wn. 2d at 660, 663 P.2d at 837; see also Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wn. App. at 89,
678 P.2d at 1298.
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prevent an obviously intoxicated guest from driving. This conduct is more
proximately related to the automobile accident caused by an intoxicated
guest than the serving of alcohol. At the point where an obviously intoxi-
cated person is about to drive an automobile, injury to other motorists and
the intoxicated driver becomes reasonably, indeed alarmingly, foreseeable.
D. Supplementary Legislative Action
In addition to judicial remedies, the legislature is in an excellent position
to develop creative mechanisms to deal with the victims and the culprits of
drunken driving. 1 12
The legislature could limt the liability of a social host by making the host
secondarily liable, by requiring a finding of wanton or reckless conduct on
the part of the host, or by limiting the amount of damages that may be
recovered from a social host. 113 These proposals, however, ignore the fact
that a host has acted negligently. A person who acts negligently generally is
held fully responsible for that damage proximately caused by the negligent
conduct. 114
The legislature should, however, pass legislation to provide certainty of
compensation to the victims of drunken driving. To ensure compensation
for victims, a special fund should be established, financed by fines levied
on those convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. " 5 This
fund could provide compensation where damage judgments are inadequate.
It could also provide assistance to those injured by parties who are not found
to be negligent under tort law. 116
The legislature should also direct the traffic safety commission to provide
information to social hosts so that hosts may learn how to effectively deal
112. The Oregon Supreme Court first extended common law negligence liability to the social host
in Wiener. 485 P.2d at 21. More than ten years after Wiener, the legislature refined the liability of social
hosts who purvey alcohol: "No private host is liable for damages incurred by an intoxicated guest unless
the private host has served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest when such guest is visibly
intoxicated." OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955 (1983). Although no cases have been brought under § 30.955,
the court of appeals has intimated that the statute was enacted for the purpose of providing a new cause of
action against social hosts. See Johnson v. Paige, 94 Or. App. 1177, 615 P.2d 1185, 1186 n.2 (1980). One
commentator has argued that the measure passed by the legislature to extend liability to social hosts is
ultimately less flexible than the original common law extension. See Graham, supra note 67, at 587-88.
113. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 101,
at 115-17.
114. See Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1221.
115. See Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 83, at 526;
Comment, supra note 101, at 115-17.
116. Financial assistance for victims of drunken driving is currently only available to those who are
victims of vehicular homicide or assault. See WASH. REv. CODE § 7.68.035 (Supp. 1984).
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with intoxicated guests and minimize the risk created by serving alcohol in
a social setting.117
IV. CONCLUSION
Drunken driving is a tragic and costly problem. Federal and state
officials are taking actions to penalize and deter those who drive while
intoxicated. Although deterrence may prevent additional deaths and inju-
ries, it does not compensate those who have already suffered bodily harm or
property damage due to drunken driving.
Tort law must be reformed to compensate persons who have suffered
injury due to the negligent conduct of social hosts. Serving alcohol is
generally not negligent conduct. Tort doctrine, however, should recognize
that a social host produces a situation of risk to the public by serving
alcohol to a guest to the point of obvious intoxication, knowing that the
intoxicated guest will be operating a motor vehicle. The courts should
provide for tort recovery if the social host negligently fails to take reason-
able steps to prevent the intoxicated guest from driving.
Society is becoming progressively less tolerant of drunken driving. We
are realizing that social acceptance of driving while intoxicated has played a
significant part in its proliferation. The time has come to recognize that
those who purvey alcohol cannot simply look the other way when an
intoxicated guest gets behind the steering wheel of an automobile. A social
host's contribution to drunken driving can no longer be tolerated as socially
acceptable behavior.
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz
117. See Id. § 43.59.140 (Supp. 1984) The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving recom-
mends that each state disseminate information to the public regarding the intoxicated driver problem.
The information should encourage members of the general public to intervene in potential intoxicated
driver situations and should teach the public how to successfully intervene to prevent drunken driving.
The report recommends that the dissemination be coordinated by a single agency See PRES. COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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